

Obscuring the true cost of management

Compensation accounting hides cash extraction and distorts valuation

The accounting rules for equity compensation are deeply flawed. They obscure the true cost and imply there is no impact on cashflow. In reality, the true cost, and the cash impact, is often multiples of the accounting expense. Worse, it incentivises management to push short-term stock performance, irrespective of the risk to long term shareholders. We think “adjusted” EBITDA as a proxy for cash generation is grossly misleading, particularly if used with buybacks. As a valuation tool, by ignoring the real costs, it simply reinforces the cycle.

Over the last three years, at some companies, the true cost of equity compensation has been 4-7x the expensed cost and true EBITDA has been as little as 3% of cumulative “adjusted” EBITDA”. Management at some blue chips have quietly been pocketing billions as profits fell. Elsewhere, management tells a growth story, but cashes out as fast as possible, leaving investors with the debt. Others are taxing pre-tax profits at 30% or more.

Our list of expensive, geared and greedy includes **Servicenow** (NOW US), **Autodesk** (ADSK US), **Netflix** (NFLX US), **Atlassian** (TEAM US), **Advance Micro** (AMD US), **Tesla** (TSLA US) and **Wayfair** (W US).

The true cost can far exceed the accounting expense

Shopify's true compensation cost over US\$600mn, 7x the US\$90m expensed

| Company | Ticker | Market cap (US\$m) | (a) Equity comp. expense 3yr cum. (local mn) | (b) Buybacks to offset stock grants 3yr cum. (local mn) | (c) Accrued dividends 3yr cum. (local mn) | (d) Mark-to-market over 3 years (local mn) | (a + b + c + d) True compensation cost 3yr cum. (local mn) | True cost/expensed (x) |
|-----------------|---------|--------------------|---|--|--|---|---|------------------------|
| Shopify Inc | SHOP CN | 16,500 | 90 | 0 | 0 | 540 | 630 | 7.1 |
| Amphenol | APH US | 29,100 | 140 | 540 | 20 | 260 | 960 | 6.8 |
| Arista Networks | ANET US | 20,300 | 180 | 0 | 0 | 1,000 | 1,180 | 6.6 |
| Chevron | CVX US | 224,900 | 720 | 0 | 1,990 | 2,010 | 4,720 | 6.6 |
| Match Group | MTCH US | 16,400 | 170 | 0 | 0 | 920 | 1,090 | 6.4 |
| Heico | HEI US | 11,100 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 130 | 6.3 |
| Teleflex | TFX US | 12,400 | 50 | 0 | 10 | 220 | 280 | 5.5 |
| Netflix | NFLX US | 158,800 | 480 | 0 | 0 | 2,010 | 2,490 | 5.2 |
| TransDigm | TDG US | 19,500 | 130 | 90 | 260 | 160 | 630 | 5.0 |
| Charter Comms | CHTR US | 82,000 | 580 | 1,630 | 0 | 300 | 2,520 | 4.3 |

Figure 1: Equity compensation: Cost vs expense (three years cumulative)

Quietly filling management's pockets

EBITDA fell, but Chevron staff quietly got an extra US\$4bn, 5.7x more than expensed

| Company | Ticker | Market cap (US\$bn) | Recurring EBITDA 3yr cum. (local mn) | Recurring EBITDA growth over 3 years (%) | Equity compensation expense 3yr cum. (local mn) | True compensation already cashed in 3yr cum. (local mn) | Total true compensation cost 3yr cum. (local mn) | Total hidden pay (true - expensed) 3yr cum. (US\$m) |
|------------------|---------|------------------------|---|---|---|---|--|--|
| Chevron Corp | CVX US | 224,900 | 57,750 | (38) | 720 | 0 | 4,720 | 4,000 |
| Cisco Systems | CSCO US | 216,700 | 45,450 | 7 | 4,590 | 3,760 | 8,350 | 3,760 |
| Oracle Corp | ORCL US | 196,100 | 48,444 | (0) | 3,990 | 3,260 | 7,260 | 3,260 |
| Intel Corp | INTC US | 210,000 | 72,258 | 8 | 4,150 | 2,970 | 7,120 | 2,970 |
| Pfizer Inc | PFE US | 251,800 | 66,999 | 6 | 2,200 | 1,970 | 4,170 | 1,970 |
| Qualcomm Inc | QCOM US | 110,300 | 23,472 | (29) | 2,880 | 1,760 | 4,640 | 1,760 |
| Walmart Inc | WMT US | 277,000 | 99,383 | (9) | 1,670 | 1,600 | 3,270 | 1,600 |
| Procter & Gamble | PG US | 208,100 | 47,212 | (5) | 1,100 | 1,060 | 2,160 | 1,060 |
| Caterpillar Inc | CAT US | 86,100 | 22,924 | (8) | 710 | 200 | 1,680 | 970 |
| Hp Inc | HPQ US | 39,600 | 16,625 | (57) | 1,120 | 850 | 1,960 | 850 |

Figure 2: Hidden pay (three years cumulative)

Talking growth, taking cash and leaving investors with debt

CDK's "adjusted" EBITDA, or profit before costs, up 72%, but management sold out

| Company | Ticker | Market cap (US\$bn) | "adjusted" EBITDA growth – last 3 years (%) | "adjusted" EBITDA 3yr cum. (local mn) | Total buybacks/ "adjusted" EBITDA 3yr cum. (%) | True compensation cost 3yr cum. (local mn) | Total buybacks/ True compensation (x) | Free float (%) | Total debt/ total assets (%) |
|-------------------|---------------|---------------------|---|---------------------------------------|--|--|---------------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------|
| Domino's Pizza | DPZ US | 11,700 | 44 | 1,550 | 139 | 130 | 17.1 | 100 | 377 |
| CDK Global | CDK US | 8,100 | 72 | 2,080 | 104 | 270 | 8.1 | 100 | 87 |
| Verisign | VRSN US | 20,000 | 19 | 2,310 | 83 | 310 | 6.2 | 88 | 82 |
| Sirius XM | SIRI US | 32,000 | 44 | 5,650 | 90 | 650 | 7.8 | 26 | 81 |
| Aspen Tech | AZPN US | 8,400 | 22 | 720 | 105 | 120 | 6.3 | 99 | 64 |
| MSCI | MSCI US | 16,200 | 59 | 1,810 | 90 | 210 | 7.7 | 97 | 63 |
| Motorola Sol. | MSI US | 20,600 | 41 | 4,640 | 97 | 420 | 10.6 | 100 | 54 |
| Fair Isaac | FICO US | 7,000 | 19 | 770 | 80 | 310 | 2.0 | 97 | 48 |
| IQVIA | IQV US | 25,600 | 172 | 4,350 | 97 | 470 | 9.0 | 81 | 45 |
| Integ. Device | IDTI US | 6,100 | 61 | 700 | 100 | 230 | 3.0 | 99 | 38 |

Figure 3: Buybacks exceed true compensation (three years cumulative)

Management keeps the stock, but taxes returns

No buybacks, but Dexcom management takes over 100% of profit

| Company | Ticker | Market cap (US\$bn) | "adjusted" EBITDA growth – last 3 years (%) | "adjusted" EBITDA 3yr cum. (local mn) | Pre-tax profit 3yr cum. (local mn) | Stock compensation 3yr cum. (local mn) | Stock compensation/ (PBT+ comp.) (%) | Stock compensation (LFY) (local mn) | Forecast PBT (local mn) | Stock compensation/ Forecast PBT (x) |
|--------------|---------|---------------------|---|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Dexcom | DXCM US | 12,600 | 144 | 178 | (170) | 300 | 233 | 110 | (10) | 112 |
| Zillow Group | ZG US | 9,400 | 386 | 363 | (290) | 340 | 740 | 110 | 50 | 70 |
| Splunk | SPLK US | 18,400 | 1,210 | 258 | (890) | 1,040 | 671 | 370 | 270 | 58 |
| Workday | WDAY US | 32,800 | 1,863 | 679 | (960) | 1,110 | 750 | 480 | 400 | 54 |
| Servicenow | NOW US | 36,100 | 1,377 | 1,076 | (520) | 1,240 | 172 | 660 | 720 | 48 |
| Yelp | YELP US | 3,900 | 121 | 346 | 0 | 250 | 100 | 100 | 140 | 43 |
| Guidewire | GWRE US | 8,600 | 47 | 328 | 50 | 230 | 81 | 90 | 130 | 40 |
| Sprint | S US | 25,800 | 99 | 31,113 | 80 | 350 | 82 | 180 | 300 | 37 |
| Atlassian | TEAM US | 22,200 | 219 | 415 | (130) | 380 | 154 | 160 | 270 | 37 |
| Mimecast | MIME US | 2,500 | 85 | 54 | (10) | 30 | 174 | 10 | 30 | 30 |

Figure 4: Real EBITDA vs 'adjusted' EBITDA- positive (three years cumulative)

Expensive, greedy and geared

Servicenow is set to take over 170% of this year's PBT pre compensation in stock

| Company | Ticker | Market cap (US\$bn) | "Adjusted" EBITDA growth (3 year %) | EV/ forecast "adjusted" EBITDA (x) | Total debt/ total assets (x) | True compensation/ expense (x) | Equity compensation/ Forecast PBT + comp (%) | EV/ forecast EBITDA less expected true compensation cost (x) |
|---------------|---------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|--|--|
| Servicenow | NOW US | 36,100 | 1,377 | 47 | 35 | 2.0 | 172 | 1,000 |
| Autodesk | ADSK US | 33,100 | Positive to Neg. | (784) | 39 | 1.7 | (297) | 176 |
| Netflix | NFLX US | 158,800 | 98 | 141 | 34 | 5.2 | 34 | 125 |
| Atlassian | TEAM US | 22,200 | 219 | 98 | 34 | 1.7 | 154 | 100 |
| Advance Micro | AMD US | 31,900 | (0) | 61 | 39 | 4.2 | Loss-making | 54 |
| Tesla | TSLA US | 50,400 | 214 | 87 | 36 | 1.6 | Loss-making | 42 |
| Wayfair | W US | 13,400 | (23) | (150) | 34 | 2.9 | Loss-making | Negative EBITDA |
| Neurocrine | NBIX US | 10,700 | (62) | (113) | 45 | 3.7 | Loss-making | Negative EBITDA |
| Hubspot | HUBS US | 6,200 | - to + | 207 | 42 | 2.5 | Loss-making | Negative EBITDA |
| Insulet | PODD US | 6,300 | 30 | 147 | 69 | 2.9 | Loss-making | Negative EBITDA |

Figure 5: Expensive, greedy and geared

Three EV/EBITDA valuations

“adjusted” EBITDA ignores the cost of management and lowers the multiple




Figure 6a: EV vs “adjusted”, recurring and true EBITDA




Figure 6b: EV vs “adjusted”, recurring and true EBITDA

Stock compensation, an opportunity to get creative

Accounting: Salary is straightforward, stock is simple, options are far more flexible

| | Cash | Stock with buyback | Options with buyback |
|----------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Expensed | When paid | During the vesting period | During the vesting period |
| Valuation | Actual value | Stock price | Assumption based |
| Real cash cost | As stated | Repurchase cost less expense | Repurchase cost less expense |
| Who pays the tax? | Recipient | Recipient | Company/shareholders |
| Impact on: | | | |
| Profit/loss | Reduced | Modest increase | Inflated |
| Bal. Sheet - equity | None | Modest decrease | Large impact |
| Operating cashflow | Reduced | Increased | Increased |
| Financing cashflow | None | Decrease as Buyback > expense | Decrease as Buyback > expense |
| Non-GAAP EBITDA | None | Inflated | Misleading/fraudulent* |

*Fraud: Intentional perversion of the truth in order to induce another to part with something of value, Merriam Webster

Figure 7: The impact of the compensation alternatives

The mathematics of compensation accounting

The cash cost for options is 3x the P&L expense, if a stock rises 20%pa

| | | Year 1 | Year 2 | Year 3 | Final cost |
|---------------------|----------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| Cash | Expense | 100 | | | 100 |
| | Cost | 100 | | | 100 |
| | Cash cost to shareholders | | | | 100 |
| Equity | Expense | 33 | 33 | 33 | 100 |
| 1 share @100 | Dividends @ 2.3% | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 7 |
| | Cost to buyback | | | 173 | 173 |
| | Cash cost to shareholders | | | | 180 |
| Options | Expense | 33 | 33 | 33 | 100 |
| 4 @100, 25% premium | Dividends/capital reduction | - | 9 | - | 9 |
| | Net cost to buyback | | | 291 | 291 |
| | Cash cost to shareholders | | | | 300 |


Assumptions

- 1) Stock rises 20% per annum
- 2) Shares are both entitled to dividends and bought back on full vesting
- 3) Options are issued at a 25% premium, entitled to dividends and are bought back on full vesting

Figure 8: Expense vs Cash cost

Estimating the true cost of equity compensation

True cost = Buyback cost (+ current market value*) + dividends, if accrued



* The current market value of any stock/option grants that have yet to be repurchased

Figure 9: Calculating real cost of equity compensation

Estimating grant and buyback quantities

Use year-end prices to derive price vs quantity

| Component | Comment |
|---|--|
| Grant, price and quantity | Based on disclosure or estimated using year-end share price |
| Buyback, price and quantity | Buyback cost/Year-end share price |
| Mark-to-market value | Stock granted less buybacks * current price less grant price |
| Dividends accrued | Stock granted less buybacks * Dividends paid |
| Real cost of management | Buybacks + current value of stock not bought back + dividends |
| Embedded assumptions | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Grants vest over 3 years- Grants are assumed to be stock based. Options would cost more- Dividends accrue starting in the year of grant | |

Figure 10: Assumptions for estimating the true cost

Calculating **True** EBITDA

“adjusted” EBITDA is misleading because it implies equity has no impact on cashflow

“adjusted” EBITDA, i.e. EBITDA with equity compensation added back, is not an indicator of either value creation or cashflow. By implying that equity compensation is cost-free and has no impact on cash generated by the business, it obscures the costs borne by shareholders and buries the true cost of compensation, i.e. stock issuance at less than the cost of re-purchase cost, in the balance sheet.

True EBITDA, i.e. adjusted for the full-cost of compensation is usually materially different to “adjusted” EBITDA.




Figure 11: Calculating real EBITDA

True EBITDA vs “adjusted” EBITDA - 3 years cumulative


Fully costed, Arista’s EBITDA would have been 3% of “adjusted” EBITDA

| Company | Ticker | Market cap (US\$bn) | Recurring EBITDA (local mn) | Equity compensation expense (local mn) | “adjusted” EBITDA (local mn) | True compensation cost (local mn) | True EBITDA* (local mn) | True EBITDA/ “adjusted” EBITDA (%) |
|------------------------|----------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|--|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Arista Networks | ANET US | 20,300 | 1,035 | 180 | 1,214 | 1,184 | 30 | 3 |
| Match Group | MTCH US | 16,400 | 1,008 | 171 | 1,179 | 1,087 | 92 | 8 |
| Salesforce.Com | CRM US | 119,200 | 2,289 | 2,411 | 4,700 | 4,292 | 408 | 9 |
| Epam Systems | EPAM US | 7,500 | 486 | 147 | 633 | 554 | 80 | 13 |
| Take-Two Inter. | TTWO US | 15,300 | 887 | 268 | 1,155 | 860 | 295 | 26 |
| Fortinet | FTNT US | 15,300 | 340 | 355 | 695 | 489 | 206 | 30 |
| Amazon.Com | AMZN US | 960,900 | 36,400 | 9,309 | 45,709 | 26,723 | 18,986 | 42 |
| ICU Medical | ICUI US | 5,800 | 421 | 47 | 469 | 253 | 215 | 46 |
| Cypress Semicon. | CY US | 5,600 | 528 | 308 | 836 | 419 | 417 | 50 |

Figure 12: True vs. “adjusted” EBITDA – (3 years cumulative, local currency)

Compensation can skew incentives: **Valeant (BHC)**


Management behaviour was rewarded with an extra US\$743m but investors lost out



| (US\$m) | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | Total |
|--|------|------|------|------|-------|------|-------|---------|--------------|
| Equity compensation expense | 49 | 93 | 66 | 45 | 78 | 140 | 0 | 0 | 472 |
| Excess compensation cost | 32 | 192 | 81 | 122 | 65 | 251 | 0 | 0 | 743 |
| Total compensation cost | 81 | 285 | 147 | 167 | 143 | 391 | 0 | 0 | 1,245 |
| Total compensation cost/Expensed (x) | 1.7x | 3.1x | 2.2x | 3.7x | 1.8x | 2.8x | | | 2.6x |
| Recurring pre-tax profit | 182 | 241 | 301 | 192 | 1,265 | 491 | (575) | (1,228) | 869 |
| Excess compensation costs/Pre-tax profit (%) | 18% | 80% | 27% | 63% | 5% | 51% | - | - | 85% |

Compensation can skew incentives: TransDigm (TDG)

Dividends/buybacks boost the stock, but management gets 66% of pre-tax profit



| (US\$m) | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | Mark-to-market | Total |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------|------------|
| Equity compensation expense | 7 | 13 | 22 | 49 | 26 | 32 | 48 | 46 | | 242 |
| Excess equity compensation cost | 51 | 67 | 145 | 202 | 192 | 177 | 35 | 13 | 2,300 | 3,211 |
| Total cost vs expensed (x) | 8.6x | 6.3x | 7.5x | 5.1x | 8.3x | 6.6x | 1.7x | 1.3x | | 14x |
| Recurring pre-tax profit | 263 | 335 | 507 | 507 | 603 | 689 | 818 | 921 | | 4,900 |
| Excess costs/ pre-tax profit (%) | 19% | 20% | 29% | 40% | 32% | 26% | 4% | 1% | | 66% |
| Retained earnings | 192 | 364 | 689 | (1,004) | (2,150) | (1,717) | (1,147) | (3,187) | | |
| Intangibles | 1,972 | 3,424 | 4,159 | 4,533 | 4,742 | 6,226 | 7,444 | 7,463 | | |

Shareholder alignment, more theory than fact at TransDigm

Very few buys, instead management tends to sell soon after vesting




Figure 13: TransDigm management stock trading

Compensation decisions and accounting at TransDigm

A solution that seems designed to inflate profits and obscure the cash cost



| Management's choice | Business impact |
|----------------------------|--|
| Below-market cash salaries | Cash costs are reduced, boosting EBITDA |
| Option awards, not stock | Same dollar value of the award results in increased dilution and cash cost |
| Vesting period | The expense is split over the vesting period, delaying the expense and boosting margins |
| Dilution | Contingent stock (outstanding options and vesting awards) is ignored for dilution calculations |
| Buybacks | Transfer the cash cost of management from the P&L to the Balance sheet |
| Equivalence payments | Shifts the tax burden on management benefits from staff to shareholders |
| Focus on EBITDA | Ignores the cost of buybacks, dividends, and the cost of finance and re-financing |
| Targeting intrinsic value | Derives total equity value, ignores dilution and the cash cost of compensation and debt issuance |

Appendix I: Compensation choices and their impact

Useful links

All available for download from [our website](#)



| Company | Link |
|--|---|
| Understanding accounting for equity compensation | SEC: Accounting for stock compensation under FASB ASC |
| | FASB: Stock compensation for non-employees (June 2018 update) |
| | FASB: Employee share-based payment accounting (March 2016) |
| Bucephalus PDFs | Asia |
| | Europe |
| | North America |
| Underlying spreadsheet | Asia |
| | Europe |
| | North America |

Appendix I: The different EBITDA variations

None of which are necessarily a good approximation for an ability to create cashflow

| EBITDA | Description |
|-----------------|---|
| Reported | As reported by the company |
| Recurring | Reported less one-off items |
| "adjusted" | Recurring + stock compensation expense |
| Real | "adjusted" less the full cost of stock compensation |
| Forecast | Bloomberg forecast EBITDA |

Recent reports

For clients, our research is available via Bloomberg, FactSet, OneAccess & Blue matrix



| Company | Ticker | Recommendation | Title |
|---------------------------------|-----------|----------------|---|
| Baidu | BIDU US | Sell/Avoid | A Fiduciary nightmare, adopting global worst practice |
| thyssenkrupp | TKA GR | Sell | Break-up revealed, real change is delayed |
| Anta | 2020 HK | Buy | The Amer bid makes strategic sense |
| Amer | AMEAS FH | Buy | Take the Anta bid seriously |
| Dometic | DOM US | Buy | Risk/reward seems fair |
| Pilgrim's Pride | PPC US | Buy | JBS needs to access Pilgrim's value |
| TransDigm | TDG US | Sell | Daylight robbery. Management takes the profit |
| Lenovo | 992 HK | Sell | Drowning in debt |
| Celltrion Inc. | 068270 KS | Sell | The dual-company structure masks investment risk |
| Bombardier | BBD/B CN | Sell | Do the maths. De-gearing will be limited at best |
| Prada | 1913 HK | Sell | Weak sales, inventory and dividend risk |
| Hengan | 1044 HK | Sell | Relationships, churn and margin pressure |
| Vinda | 3331 HK | Buy | New incentives, leverage and margins |
| Thor Industries | THO US | Buy | Cheap, shareholder-friendly, cash generator |
| BT Group | BT/A LN | Buy | Bullsh!t Tolerant |

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